Free Employment Advice - Stress: Duty of Care Owed: Foreseeability

D was employed by I for 13 years until she suffered a mental breakdown in June 2001 and became unable to work. Her initial employment was as a finance assistant. She had two periods off work with post-natal depression. Following the birth of her second child, she was promoted to payroll analyst.

I was a large international company which frequently acquired other companies. D worked on payroll integration which was sensitive and complex work. A reorganisation took place which led to an increase in D’s work and in the number of managers to whom she was responsible. Some of the managers were unaware of her previous post-natal depression.

D told her managers at least 14 times, verbally and in writing, that there were insufficient resources for her to deal with the workload for which she was responsible and that she was having to work excessive hours to complete the work.

D claimed compensation from I for chronic stress-induced depression. At first instance, her claim succeeded. The judge made the following points:

1. D was an able, committed and very conscientious employee who had suffered stress because of confused reporting lines at work and because of insufficient assistance in her job.

2. Injury to her health had been foreseeable by early March 2001 and I had failed to take appropriate action.

3. Damages of £134,000 would be awarded.

I appealed to the Court of Appeal and made the following points:

1. The judge had placed too high a burden on I because although he had conceded that the post-natal depression did not furnish it with knowledge suggesting a susceptibility to work-related depression, he had expected I to take immediate action from the date in March 2001 when it became aware of a potential problem.

2. Procedures had quickly been put in place and it could not have known that the window of opportunity to prevent D’s serious breakdown before it actually occurred would be so short.

3. I’s provision of a counselling service for use by employees was a sufficient discharge of its duty of care.

Decision: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and made the following points:

1. The judge had been fully entitled to rule that D’s stress and ill-health had been caused by a failure of management and that the injury had been foreseeable enough by early March 2001 to require immediate action.

2. The essential background to her claim was that she had occupied an important administrative position in a very large organisation for many years. She was loyal and was regarded by I as of the highest calibre, with a capacity for hard work. She had wanted to remain in her employment with I and she had promotion prospects. She did not readily complain about volume of work, nor take time off, nor tackle her problems other than by consulting those who could do something about them.

3. In the context of D’s frequent complaints of over-work and conflicting pressures upon her, the judge had been entitled to find that urgent action was required immediately from March 2001.

4. On the facts, D had been persuaded to stay in her job by unfulfilled assurances that assistance would be provided. The fact that she did not give up her job when the stresses grew did not eliminate the duty of care owed to her.

5. The finding of the trial judge that D could not be criticised for failing to use internal counselling services had to be upheld. The reference to counselling services in Sutherland v Hatton (2002) did not make such services a panacea by which employers could discharge their duty of care in all cases.

6. In the present case, the consequences of management failings were not avoided by the provision of counsellors. The only way of dealing with D’s problems would have been for management to reduce her workload.